The LHC injection systems consist of horizontally deflecting steel septum magnets and vertically deflecting kickers. A mobile beam stopper is placed downstream of the kickers for setting up with single bunches and to protect the superconducting machine elements during normal injection in the event of a malfunctioning of the kickers. The effects of various potential kicker failures and their impact on the machine have been investigated. The injection parameters, the design principles of the stopper and additional protection measures are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Two new beam transfer lines with a combined length of 5.6 km and using over 700 room-temperature magnets, TI 2 and TI 8, are being built at CERN to transport 450 GeVk protons from SPS to LHC [l] . An overview of these lines is given in [2] .
TI 2 leads to the injection into LHC ring 1 near intersection 2 (IP2), TI 8 to the injection into ring 2 near intersection 8 (IP8). Civil engineering for both lines has started in 1998. Table 1 . The destructive power of the beam imposes high precision and very good protection when injecting beam into the small aperture, superconducting LHC. The quench limit (through instantaneous energy deposition in a coil) is assumed to 38 mJ/cm' [4] , the damage limit to 87 J/cm' [5]. In the following the various modes of using the MKI/TDI ensemble, either intentionally or accidentally, will be described. Then, results of simulations are presented leading to a preliminary design of an appropriate TDI. Finally, the impact of particles escaping the TDI on the LHC is looked at, discussing the benefit from supplementary protection elements.
OPERATIONAL AND FAILURE MODES
Various circumstances of using the MKUTDI ensemble have been investigated and listed in Table 2 , grouped into "cases" with the same total kick strength seen by the beam, in order of decreasing expected occurrence. Operational (intentional) uses (marked shaded) imply normally the use of single bunches, accidental or emergency uses have to proceed from the assumption of full batch intensity. 
TDUDl SIMULATION RESULTS
The TDI/Dl ensemble has been simulated using FLUKA [6] . For the most frequent case 1 the length and the composition of the TDI was varied. The results are shown in Fig. 3 , plotted as maximum energy deposition in the D1 coil against-the number of interaction lengths of the TDI. The transverse dimensions were kept fixed at 8*8 cm. Even though the counter-rotating beam imposes a space limitation in the horizontal plane, these dimensions reveal to be sufficient with a contribution from lateral leaking of only =5*10? GeVIcm'p. Case 1 leads to no quench, even with highest intensities. Full batches in cases 2 and 3 will, without additional measures, quench D1. Case 4 (values given for grazing impact) approaches the damage limit for a nominal full batch and surpasses it slightly for the ultimate intensity.
To test the effect from additional shielding a copper cylinder (25 5 r I 140 mm, l m long) has been introduced in the simulation 3 m in front of D1. This reduced the energy deposition by about a factor 120, thus excluding damage to D1 under all circumstances. Whereas such a shield would only be mandatory for case 4 with highest intensity, it is also beneficia1 in the other cases. The figure for the sweep case at nominal batch intensity is then close to the quench level. Some further shield optimisation will probably allow to fall short of the quench level for this case. A perspective sketch of the preliminary design of the reference TDI is given in Fig. 4 . Each TDI block has 2 servo motors allowing a vertical adjustment with a precision of better than 0.1 mm. The enlargement in Fig. 4 (upper left corner) shows the front face of the TDI in more detail. The main absorber material is shrinkmounted into an aluminium frame, attached to an iron beam which in turn is moved by the motors. The required vertical movement is relatively small in IPS but in IP2 it must take into account the opening requirements of the ALICE Zero Degree Calorimeter [7] . 
OTHER IMPACTS THAN ON Dl

Triplets /Dispersion Suppressors /Arcs
The effect of injected bunches missing the TDI on other parts of the LHC than D1 has also been looked at. Two worst cases are considered:
Firstly, the case 2 where close to 20 bunches could be swept between the orbit and the TDI edge, starting to oscillate around the orbit. The mean particle density is about 2*10" p / 0.1 Q. The damage level is estimated to be 10" p lost per m, the quench level lo' p lost per m.
Damage seems therefore excluded, but to avoid a quench the TDI must be set such that it covers entirely the machine aperture of 8.5 0.
Secondly, the case 4 with a full batch just missing the TDI edge. Here the worst case particle density is about 1.6*10" p / 0.1 Q (peak). Excluding machine damage with certainty would again require a sufficient closure of the TDI.
Two additional collimators, positioned at a phase advance Ap = zk 20" from the TDI (at around 4 6 / 4 7 on the other side of the injection insertions), with the same aperture, would provide the same protection as the TDI in the presence of phase errors.
Cleaning Sections
Badly injected particles oscillating around the LHC orbit between 8.5 Q (TDI) and 7 Q (primary cleaning collimators) will end up in the LHC cleaning sections. This does not cause problems for a few bunches, but if a full batch is lost in this area, the collimators are likely to be damaged.
Experiments
Since the aperture of the experimental vacuum chambers is large compared to the machine aperture, it seems excluded that parts of the detectors can be hit directly by misinjected bunches. However-particles leaking out of the TDI or supplementary protection elements or scattered particles may reach the experiments in IP2 and IP8. Their impact is however at present estimated to be insignificant compared to the radiation from normal operation. More detailed studies are required to confirm this assumption.
CONCLUSIONS
The destructive beam power and the LHC characteristics as superconducting, small-aperture machine require highest care at injection. Mishaps can have severe consequences. Although the injection kickers are being built for utmost reliability, failures are not entirely excluded. Simulations of these failures reveal that a beam stopper with supplementary shielding and collimators can, appropriate setting assumed, provide sufficient protection, except in very rare cases where the warm aperture limiting cleaning collimators can be affected.
